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ABSTRACT 
 
We propose a number of heuristics that can be used for identifying when intransitive choice behaviour is 
likely to occur in choice situations. We also suggest two methods for avoiding undesired choice 
behaviour, namely transparent communication and adaptive choice-set generation. We believe that these 
two ways can contribute to the avoidance of decision biases in choice situations that may often be 
regretted. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When faced with a set of items, users sometimes reverse their previous preferences because of 
the presence of additional items in a choice set, even if those additional items aren’t themselves 
chosen [1] [2] [3].Because of such sensitivity to the context of choice, an item in a choice set 
can have a relative as well as an absolute value, and its relative value is often a function of how 
it relates to other items1. Moreover, it is natural to suppose that choices made between items 
under particular choice-conditions may change under other choice-conditions, even if those 
choice-conditions don’t offer any items that offer tangible gain on a previously considered 
utility function or decision rule.  
 
In what follows we propose a method for avoiding decision biases that can result from 
preference reversals caused by inner set dependencies between items in choice sets. Our 
approach is based on applying previous work on the identification of expected preference 
reversals resulting from choice intransitivity and inner-set dependencies. Our goal in the present 
paper is to suggest a number of methods by which an intelligent system can support a user in 
avoiding decision biases. Our primary focus is decision biases that result from the impact of 
dependencies between unrelated items in choice sets, but our suggestions can extend to support 
the avoidance of other kinds of decision biases.   
 
The paper will proceed as follows. In the next section (Section #2) we present a means by which 
preference reversal behaviour can be modelled [2]. In the course of doing so we present the 
phenomenon of item dependency in choice situations. Thereafter (Section #3) we generalize the 
model to include a wider range of choice situations – including various types of choice sets and 
items. We then turn to a brief discussion of the problem of additivity (Section #4) and follow by 
pointing to possibilities of a extending our generalized model by incorporating it in a system 
that learns the values of the conditional utilities of items by monitoring users’ selections in 
                                               
1
 See Dan Ariely’s now famous Economist subscription example. See: [4]. 
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various item spaces (Section #5). We then proceed to outline methods that can be used to 
support a user in avoiding decision biases such as those that result from inner-set dependencies 
between items (Section #6).  
 
2. A MODEL FOR PREFERENCE REVERSAL BEHAVIOR AND ITEM 
DEPENDENCY 
 
In order to deal with the interacting options in an option space we define a matrix A, whose i,j 
entry represents the additional utility, or gain, of the Ith  item, given the jth  item. The entries on 
the main diagonal of the matrix represent the initial utility of the item, disregarding any other 
items with which it is presented. Otherwise put: the values in the diagonal represent the utility 
that item x has in and of itself, independent of the presence of any other item. Utility shall be 
measured in pure unit-free numbers. The scale is chosen such that the biggest number on the 
main diagonal is 10, meaning that the largest value that can be attributed to an item is 10. But 
this is only for demonstrative purposes. In essence, larger or smaller scales can be used. 
 
Additionally, we assume that utilities are additive in this matrix, meaning that as a means of 
evaluating an item we add together the utilities it gets from every other available item. Hence, in 
order to find the final utility of an item (in some context or option space), we add up the entries 
of the item’s row of values and the columns of the other available options. Then we compare 
these sums and determine which item has the highest utility, given the context of the specific 
option space (note: we are aware that assuming additivity is not trivial. We have chosen to 
presuppose it since we believe it serves our system best. Nonetheless, we discuss this 
assumption further below). We also assume that the user whose choices this matrix represents is 
rational, meaning that he maximizes a utility function by choosing the item, or row, with the 
highest measure of utility. Let us flesh out this model by way of an illustrative example. 
 
You are on a business trip in an area that you are visiting for the first time, driving a car 
equipped with a point-of-interest (POI) recommendation system that offers you restaurants, 
museums, shops, and other services and points of interest upon request or proactively, based on 
your location and preferences. At some point on your journey the system offers you two 
options:  
 
  1) “Hank’s” – a club with live music (H) 
  2) A local restaurant (R).  
 
You don’t have too much information about the local music scene – e.g., what kind of music the 
local bars play, and you also feel quiet hungry, so you rate the options accordingly – you give 
Ra 10, and H a 5, reflecting your order of preference, in favor of the restaurant. You now have 
the incomplete matrix (Table 4): 
 
Table 4 
 
 
H R 
H 5 
 
R 
 
10 
 
As can be seen, the utility scores in the matrix are distributed for each item – H and R. Because 
the items that the system has offered are independent of one another and no information derived 
from one item can affect the other item, the remaining entries in the matrix are zero (Table 5): 
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Table 5 
 
 
H R Σ 
H 5 0 5 
R 0 10 10 
 
You calculate the sum of all entries in the same row, and, being rational (that is, a maximizer), 
you decide to go to the restaurant (R), because this item has the greatest overall utility. 
 
Now, before you manage to reveal your choice to the system, the system offers you a third item: 
a music festival (F). You evaluate this item at 7, and then you also realize that now the item 
relating to the possibility of going to “Hank’s” (H) sounds much better, giving it an additional 
value of 15, perhaps because the idea of going to a festival (F) made listening to music in a bar 
(H) more attractive. The important point here is that knowing about item F adds some utility to 
item H.  
 
You now have the following matrix (table 1): 
 
Table 1 
 
 
H R F Σ 
H 5 0 15 20 
R 0 10 0 10 
F 0 0 7 7 
 
As can be seen, the offer of a third item F made you assign a higher utility to the first item (H), 
and in practice it also changed the result of the inner comparison between the initial items H and 
R (we can also describe this change on a temporal dimension: whereas at time t1 you preferred 
item R to item H, at time t2, when F also became a possibility, you preferred H. Your 
preference thus reversed between t_1and t_2, as a result of the additional availability of F at t2). 
 
3. GENERALIZING THE MODEL 
 
Let us generalize this phenomenon to a case in which one faces n choices, denoted as c_1,… 
,c_n. In such a case A is an n×n matrix, whose elements are a_(i,j). As explained above, the 
main diagonal of the matrix houses the basic independent utilities of the items (Table 2): 
 
Table 2 
 
 
c c … c 
c U    
c  U   
⋮ 
  
⋱ 
 
c    U 
 
We proceed to fill in the rest of the matrix by examining the relations between the different 
items: a_(i,j) represents the additional utility of item c_i when we know c_j is present (i.e., 
when〖c〗_j is also a viable possibility). Note that in most cases, the effect isn’t symmetrical, so 
generally speakinga_(i,j)≠a_(j,i). We now get this full matrix (Table 3): 
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Table 3 
 
 	 	 … 	
 
	  ,  ,
 
	 ,    
⋮   ⋱ ⋮ 
	
 
,  … 
 
 
What we want to suggest is that the total utility of an item in some option-space C is the sum of 
the relevant row and columns. And we believe that recommender systems can benefit by so 
calculating an item’s utility: 
 
	 = 	,
∈
 
 
 
Where C is the relevant item space; C is a nonempty subset of the set of all possible items. As 
can be seen in the formula above, the utility of an item depends on its context, or on the options 
available besides that item. Understanding the effect of the context over the item’s utility allows 
us to manipulate or predict user preference as a function of the item space C. In the last 
example, we saw that when C = {H,R}, item R was preferred (i.e. U(R) > U(H)), but when we 
extended C and made it {H,R,F}, we got U(R) < U(H). By adding more items X,Y,Z, we can 
(perhaps) change the preference again. 
 
The above equation can be rearranged to get the following result: the utility of an item in context 
is the sum of the basic independent utility of that item and the additional utility caused by the 
presence of all other items in the item space. 
 
 
	 = 	 +,
∈

 
 
Henceforth our goal is to suggest a computational method that for every set of items 
{x_1,…,x_n}, from which a particular choice x_1 is made, is able to determine the conditions 
under which that choice is reversed (to some different x_k) due to an expected reversal in the 
user’s preferences. 
 
To determine in what context (in what item space) the choice is reversed to x_k - i.e. the 
conditions under which the total utility of x_k is greater than the total utility of x_1- we consider 
the difference d=x_k-x_1. 
 
Because choice x_1 is the choice made at the outset, we assume that its utility is greater than 
x_k’s and so  d<0. The method we propose tries to reverse the choice by creating conditions 
within which x_k is of greater value. Hence the method tries to maximize d, or at least make it 
positive. 
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The method enables establishing how any other x_m affects both x_1and x_k. As a rule, if x_m 
affects x_k more positively than it affects x_1, i.e. if a_km>a_1m or if it has a positive d: 
d_m=a_km-a_1m>0, then adding x_m to our choice space will increase the total utility of x_k 
relative to x_1. By gathering all such x_m’s we reach the maximal difference between x_k and 
x_1.  
 
However, this does not yet assure us that x_k will be the selected item. Two additional cases 
need to be considered for the system to be able to predict the user’s preference when other items 
are at hand: 
 
1.Even with all such x_m’s, the total utility of x_k might still be lower than x_1’s. Relating to 
the last example, if the music festival (F) is not my taste, it may add only 3 to C’s utility, and 
then item R (at 10) is still preferred over item H (at 8; Table 6): 
 
Table 6 
 
 
H R F Σ 
H 5 0 3 8 
R 0 10 0 10 
F 0 0 7 7 
 
2.Every such x_m affects not only x_k and x_1, but other x_l’s too. So it is possible that after 
taking all such x_m’s, the total utility of x_k will indeed surpass x_1’s, but the total utility of 
some other item x_l will be even higher. Following the last example, the idea of going to a 
music festival in a foreign land may sound so attractive to you, that you may prefer it over 
anything else (Table 7): 
 
Table 7 
 
 
H R F Σ 
H 5 0 15 20 
R 0 10 0 10 
F 0 0 30 30 
 
3.If we are looking at larger initial sets and we aim to reverse the choice to specific items in 
those sets then we may end up with a third item being chosen: for example, if the initial item 
space was {X,Y,Z}, out of which X was chosen, and in order to change the preference to Y in 
that set we added T,U,V, we might reach a situation in which the choice in {X,Y,Z,T,U,V} is Z. 
Hence by adding or subtracting items in the item space a user may proceed to take one of a 
number of consequent actions:  
 
a) Sticking with the previous choice;  
b) Reversing to a previously available (but not chosen) option (the one we aimed 
to reverse the choice to);  
c) Choosing one of the new options;  
d) Reversing the preference such that the option that is chosen is another, different 
option. 
 
We can now ask several questions about the collection of external items that satisfy the ‘positive 
d’ condition (by “external items” we mean items that are part of the set of all possible items, but 
currently not in the presented item space). As a reminder, element m is said to meet the ‘positive 
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d’ condition if d_m=a_km-a_1m>0, i.e. if it adds more value to the kthx_k item than it adds to 
the first item x_1. 
 
a. Which external items will give the greatest difference between the two items (the currently 
chosen option and the one we wish to reverse the option to)? i.e. what options will make me 
prefer the second item by the largest “gap”? The answer appears to be that all of the items 
that have a positive d – every one of them strengthens the utility of the kth option with 
respect to the first item, so adding them all up will give the greatest difference. 
 
b. What is the set of basic sufficient combinations of choices (choice spaces) that span the 
remaining item spaces? Evidently if a certain set of items is sufficient to tip the scales, then 
any additional item with a positive d will result in reversing the choice (making the 
difference even greater). Hence, for the collection of all item spaces that give us a total 
positive d, we may be interested in finding the minimal set of item spaces that spans all 
other combinations. This set shall be referred to as a “base” to the collection of all 
combinations that tip the scales. In other words, a set B will be a base if every item space in 
which the choice is reversed contains an element (i.e. a choice set) of B. 
 
c. What external items will give the minimal yet positive difference? i.e. what items will be 
sufficient to change one’s chosen item (to tip the scales). It should be made clear that the 
answer to this question is a member of a “base” of the collection of all preference-reversing 
combinations of items, as it is defined in answer to the previous question. 
 
4. A NOTE ABOUT ADDITIVITY 
 
In the system we proposed we assumed that utilities are additive. As a reminder, in order to get 
the total utility of an item in a choice space, our model sums the initial utility of the item and the 
additional utilities that it receives from the other items in the space. This method is distinct from 
other methods such as for instance combining utilities in non-additive ways. 
 
As far as computation time and complexity are concerned, assuming that utility is additive has 
significant implications. Without this assumption, each and every set of items must be checked 
independently, since we cannot assume any connection between different item spaces; without 
assuming additivity, knowing the user chose X out of {X,Y,Z} tells us nothing about the choice 
set {X,Y,Z,T}. Under the linear assumption, it is sufficient to know the independent effect every 
item has on any other item, regardless of the current space; in this case it is sufficient to know 
the entries of the matrix. Hence in a given space, we sum these pairwise effects to get the total 
effect. Because we assume linearity, we can add up independent partial values to get the value 
of the whole. If we do not assume additivity, we cannot infer any information about the whole 
space, even when we have full information about its subsets. 
 
What this means for the model is that with the additivity assumption, we can reduce the amount 
of item spaces (i.e. subsets of the collection of all items) to be checked from all possible subsets 
(the number of subsets of a set with n elements is 2^n) , to the number of elements in the matrix 
(n^2). This reduction, from exponential runtime to polynomial, is extremely significant, since 
exponent grows much faster than any polynomial, and so the computation time of the non-
additive method will grow rapidly, and will be impractical for even relatively small values of n. 
Hence because we assume additivity we assume that the additional gain of a set equals the sum 
of the gain of the individual elements. We therefore ignore any internal relations within the 
external group that may affect the total gain on a certain item. By considering every subset (2^n) 
we take these internal relations within the external group into consideration. The effect could 
indeed be zero; in such a case the two methods will give similar results. But if the effect is 
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nonzero, the "full method" (exponential runtime) is more accurate. For example, the utility of a 
hamburger with a good bun and quality beef exceeds the arithmetic sum of the utilities of a 
hamburger with a good bun and a hamburger with quality beef. That is, it could be that one 
quality q_1 adds some utility u_1 to an item o, and a different quality q_2 adds u_2 to o, yet 
there is something (an internal relation) in the combination of the two qualities {q_1,q_2 } that 
gives o a utility greater than q_1+q_2. The “full method” will capture this; the method proposed 
here will not. Nonetheless, our system assumes additivity because of its relative simplicity and 
because the amount of data to be considered under the additivity assumption is significantly 
smaller, and hence the amount of data to be collected is also much smaller, which means much 
less for the system to learn. 
 
5. LEARNING CONDITIONAL UTILITIES 
 
The system learns the values of the conditional utilities of items (i.e. the entries of the matrix A) 
by monitoring users’ selections in various item spaces. Every selection that a user makes of an 
item from an item space is translated to an inequality with A’s entries, and using many such 
inequalities, a prediction for the exact values of the matrix may be made. Every selection made 
in an option space gives N inequalities (N being the number of options in the option space). 
Large amounts of data give us large amounts of inequalities. Every such inequality poses a 
constraint; by considering all such constraints, the region (in the n^2 space) in which the actual 
Matrix’s entries are to be found is narrowed down. With enough constraints it is therefore 
possible to give good estimates for the matrix entries. 
 
For instance, if when being presented options 1 and 2 the user chooses 1, then we may assume 
that U(c_1 )>U(c_2), i.e. U_1+a_1,2>U_2+a_2,1. However, if when option 3 is also present the 
user chooses 2, that means that U_1+a_1,2+a_1,3<U_2+a_2,1+a_3,1. Every such inequality 
defines a region in an n^2-dimensional world (a dimension for every entry in the matrix). By 
considering many such regions, we can narrow down the options for every entry, and by that get 
a good estimation for their exact numerical values. 
 
Several methods may be employed to improve this learning process: 
 
• .Since we do not consider the exact numerical utility, but just compare different utilities, 
we may normalize all values, such that, for example, U_1=1 (otherwise, we can 
multiply the whole matrix by a constant to get that, and the recommendation results will 
be identical. What we mean here is that it doesn’t matter if A = [1 2; 3 4] or A = [2 4; 6 
8]; all that matters are the proportions. If with the first matrix we arrived at utility 8, the 
second matrix will give utility 16, and so on, i.e. it’s all monotonous (if X > Y with 
matrix A, this inequality will remain true if we use 2A or 6A). So we can divide all 
elements of the matrix by a constant and remain with the same properties, so we can 
assume U1 = a11 = 1 (otherwise, if a11 = 8, we’ll just divide it all by a factor of 8.)). 
 
• If the system records many selections made in the same option space, the system may 
use that information in order to estimate the “gap” between options. For instance, if 
when given A and B the user chose A 97% of the time, then the gap may be big, but if 
the user chose A only 51% of the time, then the total utilities of A and B (in that 
context) are identical, or close to identical. This replaces the inequality with an equality, 
which is far better computationally, as it reduces the dimension of the problem by one. 
 
• As explained before, the values on A’s main diagonal U_k=a_(k,k) represent the utility 
the option has in and of itself. Therefore, after a selection has been made, the system 
may ask to rate the selection in a context free environment, in order to get an estimated 
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value of U_k, or at least an estimation for the effect cause by the context. For example, 
in book recommendations, out of three books A, B, and C, book B seems very 
appealing, so you choose to read it and discover that it is in fact boring. You may feel 
cheated; in its context, the book seemed interesting, however when it was context-free, 
it was boring. That means that the presence of books A and C had a positive effect on 
the contextual (total) utility of book B. 
 
6. AVOIDING DECISION BIASES 
 
At this stage it is important to make explicit an assumption which we have been making so far. 
We have been assuming that preference reversals in choice behavior due to dependency 
between items in choice sets are undesirable. And it is in relation to the undesirability of these 
situations that we are am proposing methods on how to avoid them. Yet we should also note 
that it is perfectly clear that there will be cases where preferences shift due to the impact that 
dependent but non-chosen items have on other items in choice sets and this will be perfectly 
rational. In such cases items may provide information or ignite emotional considerations that 
may lead to reasonable and desired shifts in preference, and this seems to be perfectly legitimate 
from a normative point of view. Moreover, in such cases what is occurring will not be a 
decision bias, but an informed shift in preference due to new information provided by an 
additionally present item. There doesn’t seem to me to be any single clear cut way of 
distinguishing between desirable and undesirable shifts in preference that result from inner-set 
item dependency. But there are a few contending rules of thumb that can be used to identify 
such undesirable shifts, and these can be used for systems that aim to support users in avoiding 
undesired choice behaviors: 
 
1. Inconsistency with general, or prevalent preferences: if I always prefer P whenever P 
and Q are offered together, and in this one instance where T is also on offer I prefer Q, 
this is an expressive reversal of a dominant preference of mine – namely choosing P 
when P and Q. From here it seems fair to conclude that if I generally choose P from P 
and Q, then P is my prevalent preference. Which by choosing Q I am presently going 
against, and which in turn makes such behavior undesirable.  
 
2. Preferences indicative of choice patterns that are later regretted (or retracted): if the 
system learns to identify choices (understood as revealed preferences) that result from 
item dependency in choice sets which are then retracted, then the system can learn to 
predict when preference reversals are likely to have undesired consequences, and thus 
label such choice constellations (particular sets of items) as sensitive to undesirable 
shifts in preferential behavior. 
 
3. Identifying suspect items: if there are particular items that tend to lead users to change 
their preferences, as in cases noted in #1 and #2 above, and these items are identified as 
doing so for many people (statistically viable numbers of people that can be relied on as 
“collective behavior”) then these items may be labeled as “suspect.” Choice sets with 
‘suspect’ items may thus be treated with greater caution and choices made from these 
sets (if different from dominant choice patterns or reflective of retractable behaviors) 
may be regarded as undesirable with a greater degree of confidence. 
 
Now we turn to the question of how decision biases can be avoided. Or, more specifically, what 
kind of methods may be used to avoid undesirable choice behaviour. We will propose two 
methods stemming from the proposed rules of thumb for identifying undesirable preferential 
shifts mentioned above.  
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Transparent communication: one, quite obvious but generally underappreciated way of helping 
people avoid decision biases such as intransitive choices, is communicating to them that they 
are making an intransitive choice. The simplest way of doing so would be choosing the most 
effective medium or modality by which to say something along the lines of “are you sure you 
want Q, because you normally choose P when (P and Q)?”  
 
This tactic would seemingly be most useful in cases such as those noted in #1 above, those 
involving inconsistency with general or prevalent preferences, from which individual instances 
of choice changes can be differentiated. But transparent communication could also be used in 
cases such as those mentioned in #2, when choice behaviours that are later regretted or retracted 
are identified. In cases such as these messages informing the user of past retractable actions 
might be useful, as would noting the long term benefits (tangible and symbolic) of transitive, or 
desirable choices, as opposed to choices that may seem appealing in the present choice set, but 
may be regarded negatively later on.  
 
Transparent communication could also come in useful in cases such as those outlined in #3, 
where collective user behaviour makes some items more suspect than others in leading to 
undesired choices. In these situations we might envision highlighting a suspect item, or 
emphasizing to the user that extra caution ought to be taken when considering which item to 
choose.  
 
Adaptive choice-set generation: if the system expects with a sufficiently high probability that a 
particular item in a choice set or the specific composition of a choice-set as a whole will lead to 
undesirable preference reversals, this same system can adapt to the consequence it expects and 
thus mitigate risk. Using the matrix system proposed above, the system is able not only to detect 
when item utilities will change such that preferences will be reversed but also what additional 
items are needed in the set to reverse the reverse choice that the system predicts. So the matrix 
system can adapt to predicted choice behaviour by generating choice-set with item compositions 
that accord with the preferences that it believes are of the highest importance to the user. As 
such, the system’s own utility considerations incorporate the predicted utilities of the user and 
the preferences that it believes the user really wants to satisfy.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Building on a method for predicting intransitive choice behaviour resulting from choice-set 
compositions, we have proposed a number of heuristics that may be used for identifying when 
intransitive choice behaviour resulting from preference reversals may be regarded as 
undesirable and thus as something that a supportive system ought to avoid. We have also 
suggested two methods for avoiding the undesired choice behaviour, namely transparent 
communication and adaptive choice-set generation. We believe that these two ways can 
contribute to the avoidance of decision biases that may often be regretted. 
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